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RETHINKING DEFERENCE:
HOW THE HISTORY OF CHURCH
PROPERTY DISPUTES CALLS INTO
QUESTION LONG-STANDING
FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
Eric G. Osborne* and Michael D. Bush**
BECAUSE of First Amendment concerns, church property istreated in a different manner than practically any other type ofproperty. Yet, as an area of First Amendment law, church prop-
erty law draws comparatively little attention. A myriad of law review arti-
cles have been written on the subject in recent years—many of them
student notes—but the recent scholarship is doctrinal and focuses almost
exclusively on disputes and proposals for how the Supreme Court should
treat the subject.1 What is sorely lacking is a deep and scholarly dive into
the historical roots of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Such an analy-
* Eric G. Osborne is a litigation associate at Andrews Kurth Kenyon LLP. A gradu-
ate of Stanford Law School, Eric earned a Master of Divinity (M. Div.) from Princeton
Theological Seminary before enrolling in law school. A substantial portion of Eric’s prac-
tice is devoted to representing churches and other faith-based institutions.
** Michael D. Bush is a Presbyterian minister. Having earned master’s degrees from
Union Presbyterian Seminary and Yale University Divinity School, he received the Ph.D.
in history of doctrine from Princeton Theological Seminary. He has served on the faculty
of Erskine Theological Seminary and the staff of Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary,
and has published a number of scholarly and popular articles, books, and reviews.
1. See Christopher W. Wynne, Comment, WWJD: A True Neutral Principles Ap-
proach? Arkansas Courts Should Take Another Look, 65 ARK. L. REV. 481, 481 (2012);
Bernie D. Jones, Litigating the Schism and Reforming the Canons: Orthodoxy, Property &
the Modern Social Gospel of the Episcopal Church, 42 Golden Gate U.L. REV. 151,
152–153 (2012); Brian Schmalzbach, Note, Confusion and Coercion in Church Property
Litigation, 96 VA. L. REV. 443, 443–44 (2010); Mark Strasser, When Churches Divide: On
Neutrality, Deference, and Unpredictability, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 427, 429 (2009); Cameron
W. Ellis, Note, Church Factionalism and Judicial Resolution: A Reconsideration of the Neu-
tral-Principles Approach, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1001, 1002 (2009); Jeffrey B. Hassler, Comment,
A Multitude of Sins? Constitutional Standards for Legal Resolution of Church Property
Disputes in a Time of Escalating Intradenominational Strife, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 399, 400–05
(2008); Meghaan Cecilia McElroy, Note, Possession is Nine Tenths of the Law: But Who
Really Owns a Church’s Property in the Wake of a Religious Split Within a Hierarchical
Church?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 311, 313–18 (2008); Justin M. Gardner, Note, Ecclesias-
tical Divorce in Hierarchical Denominations and the Resulting Custody Battle over Church
Property: How the Supreme Court Has Needlessly Rendered Church Property Trusts Inef-
fectual, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 235, 236–38 (2007); Kathleen E. Reeder, Note, Whose
Church is it, Anyway? Property Disputes and Episcopal Church Splits, 40 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 125–28 (2006); Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Con-
flicts over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1843 (1998).
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sis provides clarity into what motivated the earliest decisions and may call
into question some fundamental assumptions upon which the entire area
of law rests.
The basic principle of church property law is that the First Amendment
limits what matters courts may decide, particularly if such matters in-
fringe on ecclesiastical issues. Beginning with a landmark case in 1871,
the United States Supreme Court decided that secular courts could not
decide ecclesiastical matters.2 Instead, the Court opined, courts should
defer to the hierarchy of a church denomination.3 In the decades that
followed, the Court enshrined that holding as a matter of First Amend-
ment law.4
Any major phenomenon involves a who, what, when, where, and why.
In the case of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence adopting the hierarchi-
cal deference model, the first four questions have been answered. The
deference model (what) was adopted by the Supreme Court (who/where)
in 1871 (when).5 But to the best of our knowledge, the why has never
been explored. Yes, the Watson v. Jones opinion itself gives a reason—the
Court stated that America’s principles of freedom of religion required
deference.6 But why did the justices decide then, at that time, that princi-
ples of freedom of religion required deference when the common law had
been to the contrary for so long?
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, in explaining stare decisis and when it
is proper for the Court to overrule precedent, Justice O’Connor empha-
sized that the Court reconsiders doctrine when “[s]ociety’s understanding
of the facts upon which a constitutional ruling [is] sought . . . [are] funda-
mentally different from the basis claimed for the [prior] decision.”7 As
Justice O’Connor concluded, “In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere
in life, changed circumstances may impose new obligations.”8 If a deci-
sion’s “factual underpinnings” are challenged, the decision may be
reexamined.
This Article demonstrates that the factual underpinnings of the original
Watson decision are suspect, such that the “changed conditions” present
today should cause the courts to reconsider long-held doctrinal beliefs.
As detailed below, the Watson decision was made by a radical Republi-
can Court in the wake of the Civil War at a time of intense national divi-
sion. 9 At least some historians have suggested that the impetus of the
decision might have been to restore national unity by empowering north-
2. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 730 (1871).
3. Id.
4. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952) (holding in a post-
Erie environment that the First Amendment mandated deference to a church hierarchy).
5. Watson, 80 U.S. at 730.
6. Id. at 728.
7. 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992).
8. Id. at 864.
9. See discussion infra Part VII.
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ern churchmen,10 but a look at the actual history shows that unity is prob-
ably not what motivated northern churchmen (i.e., the Court may have
been misled on that account). Moreover, the decision had the opposite
effect as it played a role in intra-church division for generations to come.
By the time the next-round of church schism emerged in the 1930s, the
deference rule was firmly ensconced.11 Legal scholars, now decades re-
moved from the Civil War did not understand the context of the defer-
ence rule. It became an accepted part of constitutional jurisprudence.
In 1979, the Supreme Court finally limited Watson when, in Jones v.
Wolf, the Court held that states could also apply a “neutral principles”
approach to church property, rather than just hierarchical deference.12
But even then four justices dissented, believing they had to follow the
deference rule as a matter of constitutional law.13 Since then, state courts
have divided over the rules they apply and the mandates of the
Constitution.14
We suggest that the deference model itself is fundamentally flawed and
has been ab initio. We do this by looking at the political and religious
context in which the original decision was made. We then examine histo-
rian Mark DeWolf Howe’s contention that the decision was made to
prompt national unity and show that it, in fact, promoted disunity. The
result of the deference rule has been to empower denominational hierar-
chies, thus making divisions and intra-church fights for control especially
bitter. In today’s world of partisanship and division, scholars, practition-
ers, and jurists alike would do well to reconsider deference and its
repercussions.
I.
In connection with the Civil War, there was an old Presbyterian legend
that Cyrus McCormick, inventor of the famous reaper, had once said that
before the war, “the two great hoops holding the Union together were
the Democratic Party and the Old School Presbyterian Church.”15 It is
not surprising McCormick would have made such a statement, for he was
heavily involved in both the Democratic Party and the Presbyterian
Church.16 Indeed, McCormick’s involvement in Presbyterian life was so
great, and his beneficence so large, that one of the church’s oldest semi-
10. MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 81 (1965).
11. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 728.
12. 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979).
13. Id. at 610.
14. See infra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., LEWIS G. VANDER VELDE, THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES AND THE
FEDERAL UNION: 1861-1869 21 (1932).
16. Mitchell Wilson, Cyrus Hall McCormick: American Industrialist and Inventor, EN-
CYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (July 29, 2015), http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
354011/Cyrus-Hall-McCormick [https://perma.cc/9W9F-2U7C].
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naries bears his name.17
McCormick’s claim has a strong basis in fact. The Presbyterians may
very well have been the only significant national organization—other
than the Democratic Party—that transcended the country’s growing sec-
tional divide. By the start of the Civil War, of the three largest Protestant
denominations in the United States,18 only the Old School Presbyterian
Church remained united. The Methodists had split over the issue of slav-
ery in 1844.19 The Baptists followed the Methodist lead in 1845.20 In con-
trast, the Presbyterians had split in 1837 over doctrinal and polity issues
rather than regional and political issues.21
To be sure, the Old School’s non-division was more a reflection of the
church’s decision not to address slavery forcefully, rather than a sign of
unity.22 But by 1861, the Old School Presbyterian Church, the largest
Presbyterian denomination in the country, was scattered widely across
the United States, yet still linked together in its governing structure.23
Despite McCormick’s saying and the ongoing connection of the Pres-
byterian Church leading up to the Civil War, it was nevertheless a dispute
within the Old School Presbyterian Church at issue in Watson v. Jones.
The United States Supreme Court’s first entry into such disputes involved
a church property dispute from Kentucky.24 Prior to Watson, state courts
handled church property disputes, but previous disputes were local and
centered on specific issues of state law.25 In Watson, the Supreme Court
stepped into a national controversy and developed principles of federal
common law that came to apply generally throughout the land.
Those principles still apply in many jurisdictions today, as church prop-
erty litigation has become one of the most active, yet rarely discussed,
areas of First Amendment law. In a flurry of litigation during the past
decade—and at an ever-increasing pace—state high courts have been de-
ciding church property disputes according to First Amendment principles
17. Our History, MCCORMICK THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, http://mccormick.edu/con-
tent/our-history [https://perma.cc/LT6C-QWPA].
18. See VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 4 (noting that Methodists, Baptists, and
Presbyterians were the most important Christian denominations, from a numerical per-
spective, in 1860).
19. See The Slavery Question and Civil War: 1844-1865, UNITED METHODIST CHURCH,
http://www.umc.org/who-we-are/the-slavery-question-and-civil-war [https://perma.cc/
MV8K-LM7M].
20. American Baptists: A Brief History, AMERICAN BAPTIST CHURCHES 3, http://www
.abc-usa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/history.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQE3-GZ3Y]; see
also About Us, SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION, http://www.sbc.net/aboutus/default.asp
[https://perma.cc/5XCY-YPBF].
21. VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 4. As we shall see below, one of the resulting
denominations, the New School Presbyterians, was strongly abolitionist, but this was not a
reason for the division of 1837. See infra notes 77–83 and accompanying text.
22. In this way, the Old School Presbyterian Church was similar to the political struc-
tures of the country as a whole that similarly refused to address the issue of slavery head-
on.
23. VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 4.
24. 80 U.S. 679, 713 (1871).
25. See, e.g., Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 488, 492–93 (1820); McGinnis v. Watson, 41 Pa. 9,
13–14 (1861).
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set out by the United States Supreme Court.26 The Court has ruled that
the First Amendment “commands civil courts to decide church property
disputes without resolving controversies over religious doctrine” or “ec-
clesiastical questions.”27 When dealing with disputes within churches that
are considered “hierarchical,” courts instead must decide such disputes
via one of two constitutional paths: deference to the decision of the
church hierarchy (the deference model) or adjudication pursuant to neu-
tral principles of property law.28 Since the Supreme Court approved the
neutral principles approach, more and more state courts have opted for it,
but courts have been divided over what “neutral principles” entails. Some
courts have ruled that the First Amendment permits or even requires
them to enforce trust provisions in denominational constitutions,29 while
others read neutral principles to require judgments based on the same
property law applied to non-religious entities.30
Such disagreements between state courts over First Amendment re-
quirements continue to percolate, as even more states have cases pend-
ing.31 Although the Supreme Court has so far denied requests to clarify
the issue,32 the divide over a constitutional question, coupled with the
26. See infra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
27. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
28. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602–06 (1979) (explaining that hierarchical deference
is not required; neutral principles is a constitutionally permissible).
29. A Louisiana court treated an argument to this effect by a general church as a
sanctionable misrepresentation of Jones v. Wolf. Carrollton Presbyterian Church v. Presby-
tery of S. La. of Presbyterian Church, 2014-1214 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/9/15), 172 So. 3d 1,
5–6, 13, writ denied, 2015-0682 (La. 5/22/15), 171 So.3d 257. But see, e.g., In re Episcopal
Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66, 84 (Cal. 2009); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Timber-
ridge Presbyterian Church, Inc. v. Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2772
(2012), (No. 11-1101), 2012 WL 755072; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14–15, Gauss v.
Protestant Episcopal Church in United States, 132 S. Ct. 2773 (2012) (No. 11-1139), 2012
WL 900636; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Rector v. Episcopal Church, 132 S. Ct.
2439 (2012) (No. 11-1166), 2012 WL 991422; Episcopal Diocese of Rochester v. Harnish,
899 N.E.2d 920, 921 (N.Y. 2008); Hope Presbyterian Church of Rogue River v. Presbyte-
rian Church, 255 P.3d 645, 647 (Or. Ct. App. 2011); Convention of Protestant Episcopal
Church in Diocese of Tennessee v. St. Andrew’s Parish, No. M2010-01474-COA-R3-CV,
2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 274, at *34–41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).
30. See, e.g., Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. Graham, 54 F.3d 522, 525–26 (8th Cir.
1995) (applying Missouri law); Ark. Presbytery of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church v.
Hudson, 40 S.W.3d 301, 306–07 (Ark. 2001); Presbytery of Ohio Valley, Inc. v. OPC, Inc.,
973 N.E. 2d 1099, 1106–07 (Ind. 2012); Carrollton Presbyterian Church v. Presbytery of S.
La. of Presbyterian Church (USA), 2011-0205 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/14/11), 77 So.3d 975, 977,
writ denied sub nom. Carrollton Presbyterian Church v. Presbyterian of S. La. of Presbyte-
rian Church (USA), 2011-2590 (La. 2/17/12), 82 So.3d 285; Heartland Presbytery v. Gash-
land Presbyterian Church, 364 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012); All Saints Parish
Waccamaw v. Protestant Episcopal Church in Diocese of S.C., 685 S.E.2d 163, 171–72 (S.C.
2009), cert. dismissed, 130 S. Ct. 2088 (2010).
31. See Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth v. Episcopal Church, 422 S.W.3d 646, 650–52
(Tex. 2013); see also Brief of Appellant at 22–29, Convention of Protestant Episcopal
Church in Diocese of Tenn. v. Rector, Wardens, & Vestrymen of St. Andrew’s Par., No.
M2010-01474-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 4279303, at *22–29 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2012)
(denying appeal).
32. See supra note 30.
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sheer scope of ongoing litigation that affects thousands of churches com-
prised of millions of members, begs for resolution.
But what if a crucial building block of this entire area of law, the hier-
archical deference rule as enunciated in Watson, the Supreme Court’s
first church property case, is faulty? What if the very first Supreme Court
case on church property was so politicized (and so captured by a particu-
lar, fervent religious creed) as to raise serious suspicions about the defer-
ence rule? This Article examines the religious and political history behind
Watson to make precisely this point. The history shows that the Watson
decision discarded centuries of common law (and centuries of Presbyte-
rian theological and ecclesiastical understanding) and let loose an array
of unintended consequences for both the law and the churches. This
ought to give every contemporary jurist and practitioner pause.
It is difficult to see the context of the Civil War and Reconstruction in
which Watson unfolded with neutral eyes because we now comprehend
just how evil the institution of slavery was and therefore question the
motives of those who supported it. But, in law things are rarely so simple.
It is only by looking directly at difficult issues that clarity can emerge.
A landmark case, Watson had more at stake than the fight over slavery
that roiled the nation at that time. As we shall see, matters of polity,
belief, theology—including, fundamentally, what it means to be a Chris-
tian—were at issue. Those matters tore churches asunder, even as the
nation came back together after that war. The Supreme Court’s decision
had an enormous impact on those theological issues, even as its opinion
ostensibly held that it could not do so, and altered how churches in the
United States would govern themselves thereafter. The repercussions,
both for the law and through its effects for the church, remain with us
today.
It is our view, as a matter of law and history, that Watson was a short-
sighted decision made by a politicized court controlled by justices with
fervent religious views. We argue that Watson grossly distorted legal and
theological understandings of church polity and church property and led
to the transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars in real property to par-
ties that had never paid for it. Although we have no patience for people
whose sympathies, votes, dollars, and lives supported the horror of Amer-
ican slavery, a reexamination of the Watson decision from a historical
point of view suggests a rethinking of this area of law is necessary today if
courts are to fairly adjudicate the latest manifestation of church property
disputes. 33
33. We are writing about the great Presbyterian schisms of the nineteenth century.
Over the last few years, another schism has divided the Presbyterian Church over LGBT
rights. David Masci & Michael Lipka, Where Christian churches, other religions stand
on gay marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/20
15/12/21/where-christian-churches-stand-on-gay-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/CN42-RD6W].
This Article reaches no conclusion on the merits of any contemporary schisms other than
to show that how the law treats church property has a profound effect on the church itself.
A case could be made that the most recent schism would not have happened if local con-
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II.
Watson v. Jones originally involved a question of who were the rightful
elders of the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church in Louisville, Ken-
tucky.34 This primary question gave rise to the question of who rightfully
held the property.35 At the beginning of the controversy, the majority of
the congregation had sympathized with the Confederacy and a significant
plurality sympathized with the Union.36 By the time the Supreme Court
received Watson, most of the Southern faction had left the congregation,
but continued as parties to the case.37
While the Supreme Court’s opinion spoke to specific trusts and inde-
pendent congregations as well,38 the crux of the opinion centered on how
property disputes involving what it called hierarchical churches should be
decided.39 The Court held that “whenever the questions of discipline, or
of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the
highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried,
the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on
them, in their application to the case before them.”40 The decision over-
turned the previous common law rule known as “Lord Eldon’s Rule,”
which held that property should go to the faction most true to the beliefs
of the church’s founders.41 The Court justified abandoning the common
law rule because “[i]n this country the full and free right to entertain any
religious belief . . . is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is
committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.”42 In
short, the Court held that it could not make decisions regarding theology
and church doctrine. Instead, the Watson Court established the “hierar-
chical deference” principle, a unique principle of American law that re-
quires courts to defer to the hierarchy of a church (when one exists) in
deciding church property matters.43
gregations did not have to worry about losing their property when caught in a denomina-
tion in which they are a theological minority.
34. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 694–96 (1871). The Presbyterian Church is governed
under a democratic structure. An “elder” is an elected ruling member in a Presbyterian
congregation. A group of elders composes the Session, which is the ruling body for the
congregation. In the case of the Walnut Street Church, trustees held title to the land, but
they were to hold the land for the benefit of the congregation and according to its wishes as
expressed through its ruling elders. See id. at 683. Thus, although the trustees technically
held the property, since they were bound to follow the lead of the elders, the property was
effectively held by the elders. The dispute in Watson was originally over who were the
rightful elders of the congregation. Id. at 717–718.
35. Id. at 696–99.
36. Id. at 691–92.
37. Id. at 692–93.
38. Id. at 723–24.
39. For an argument that Watson’s division of the ecclesiastical universe into hierarchi-
cal and congregational polities is fatally flawed, see Michael W. McConnell & Luke W.
Goodrich, On Resolving Church Property Disputes, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 307, 327–28 (2016).
40. Watson, 80 U.S. at 727.
41. See Attorney-General v. Pearson, [1817] 36 Eng. Rep. 135, 150 (H.L.).
42. Watson, 80 U.S. at 728.
43. Id. at 730.
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When the United States Supreme Court stepped in, it overruled a Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals decision,44 which had been based on Kentucky
common law and the trial court’s fact-finding.45 For the highest court of
the land to override a state court decision is somewhat irregular, but this
is not the most irregular fact of Watson v. Jones. Federal jurisdiction was
itself at issue.
The question of federal jurisdiction had at least two important aspects.
One was whether the plaintiffs in the federal suit had moved to Indiana
merely to create diversity jurisdiction so their case could be heard in fed-
eral court. The plaintiffs claimed to be citizens of Indiana.46 The defend-
ants disputed this; they argued that the plaintiffs had moved to Indiana as
a “contrivance for the purpose of bringing and prosecuting this suit, and
to give this court seeming jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matter
set up in complainants’ bill.”47 However, in 1855, the Supreme Court held
that it was permissible for a party to engage in such a contrivance, so long
as the move reflected a good faith intention to take up residence in the
second state.48 Thus, the question became whether these plaintiffs had
moved to Indiana with the intention to remain. William Jones, a plaintiff
in the federal suit, was challenged at trial about his intention, and testi-
fied, “I would have moved to New Albany, Indiana without reference to
the suit,” and that he did not intend to return to Kentucky.49 The Su-
preme Court majority did not question the veracity of Jones’s testimony,
or seriously consider this issue in any way. In the decision, Justice Miller
brushed the question aside with an assertion that the Watson party had
abandoned the argument.50 Within a few years, the Supreme Court held
that it was necessary for courts to satisfy themselves that they have juris-
diction whether the parties challenge it or not, so Watson almost certainly
would not be heard by federal courts today. But this was not yet the rule
in 1871.51
The other jurisdictional problem, and the basis upon which Justices Na-
than Clifford and David Davis dissented in Watson, was that a substan-
tially identical action was alive in a state court when the federal suit was
filed.52 Though the state appellate court had ruled nominally in favor of
the southern faction, while at the same time requiring that they use the
44. At that time, the Court of Appeals was the highest court in Kentucky.
45. Watson v. Avery, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 332, 349 (1867).
46. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. at 694.
47. Abstract of Evidence and Pleadings at 33, Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871) (No.
108), reprinted in SUPREME COURT RECORDS AND BRIEFS, 1832-1978 (Gale 2013) [herein-
after Abstract].
48. Jones v. League, 59 U.S. 76, 81 (1855) (“The change of citizenship, even for the
purpose of bringing a suit in the federal court, must be with the bona fide intention of
becoming a citizen of the State to which the party removes. Nothing short of this can give
him a right to sue in the federal courts, held in the State from whence he removed.”).
49. Papers of John Marshall Harlan, Part I, Legal File, Box 12, Reel 9, Library of
Congress.
50. Watson, 80 U.S. at 714.
51. Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 325–26 (1889).
52. Watson, 80 U.S. at 735 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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property in accord with the northern faction’s wishes, the marshal of the
state Chancery Court refused to release the property—in defiance of
three orders to do so.53 Control of the property was finally released in
September, 1868, but the federal case had been filed the previous July
when the Chancery Court still controlled the property. 54 For this reason,
Justice Clifford (a New England Unitarian, about as far religiously speak-
ing from a southern Presbyterian as possible) wrote in the dissent:
I am of the opinion that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to hear
and determine the matter in controversy, as there were two courts of
common law exercising the same jurisdiction between the same par-
ties in respect to the same subject-matter, within the same territorial
limits, and governed by the same laws.55
Though the state and federal courts might have originally had concur-
rent and coordinate jurisdiction, the matter was first filed in state court,
so the Circuit Court should have dismissed the federal suit “for the want
of jurisdiction.”56 Nevertheless, the majority distinguished the factual
backgrounds of the state and federal cases, finding that the fulfillment of
a schism within the congregation that was only beginning to take shape
when the state suit was filed created a distinct set of issues to be tried in
federal court.57 On this basis, however slim, the majority found that the
federal courts could exercise jurisdiction.58
Yet even this is not the most surprising fact of Watson. The most sur-
prising fact of all is that the plaintiffs enjoyed unchallenged use of the
church property at the time, and called a minister who shared their con-
victions.59 They brought the suit merely because of a “frequently
threatened and announced” intention by the defendants that they would
try to take possession.60 The Watson (i.e., southern) party pursued their
claim in state court, defended themselves when sued in federal court, and
then appealed to the Supreme Court.61 However, they made no effort to
encroach upon the northern group’s use of the property. Indeed, Justice
Miller acknowledged in the decision that the Watson party had moved on
in their ecclesiastical life.62 Therefore, it appears that there was no claim
for relief when the federal case was filed and that the suit should have
been dismissed as moot ab initio.
Why, then, would the Court go to such lengths in a trivial—perhaps
moot—dispute?
53. Id. at 688–89.
54. See id. at 690.
55. Id. at 737 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Watson, 80 U.S. at 717.
58. Id.
59. See infra notes 191 and accompanying text.
60. Abstract, supra note 47, at 29.
61. Watson, 80 U.S. at 685–90.
62. Id. at 734.
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Mark DeWolfe Howe has argued that the reason may have been pri-
marily political. According to Howe, the majority of the Court may have
felt that “they must somehow support the loyalists among the Presbyteri-
ans,” and thus “[t]he nation’s supreme authority . . . decreed that those
Presbyterians who were loyal to the Union, not those who were faithless,
could hold the church’s property.”63 Howe does not directly state that
something as mundane as pure sectarian partisanship was the foundation
of the Watson decision;64 his focus is on the Court’s sympathy for “unify-
ing forces in American society.”65 As Howe puts it, the Court wanted “to
see a nation spring up from the dust of nullification and the ashes of war,”
and the Court was willing to support churches that might achieve this
purpose.66 His theory is simple—if the Old School Presbyterian Church
was the “hoop holding together the Union,” then supporting the church’s
hierarchy in disputes with recalcitrant congregations was one way to “re-
establish effective spiritual authority throughout the land.”67
Perhaps Howe is right that the Watson Court intended to support uni-
fying forces in the Reconstruction era, though we raise doubts about this
below.68 However, it is certain that if such was the Justices’ intention,
their support for the Old School General Assembly missed the mark. In
fact, actions by the post-war Presbyterian General Assemblies described
below, partly in response to Watson, further divided the citizens who
were its members.69 If the Court indeed wanted to re-establish a unified
spiritual authority, it would have done well to rule the opposite way, or
better yet, to leave the matter in the hands of Kentucky courts.
Moreover, it seems clear that Howe’s implied, more mundane point is
surely true. Partisanship did motivate the Court in its choice to exercise
“extraordinary—perhaps even outrageous”70 jurisdiction, even when
there was no common law ground nor any real necessity to do so. On the
other hand, although the state court that ruled for the breakaway group
followed the traditional common law, it may have been similarly caught
up in a religious and political divide that permeated the state of
Kentucky.
In the controversy leading to the Watson decision, political questions
came to be seen as theological—with legal consequences. Disagreement
over those confused issues divided the Church and the Louisville Presby-
tery,71 together with the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church within it.
63. HOWE, supra note 10, at 81.
64. Howe states merely that he “supposes” this to be a possibility. His focus is more on
the rationale of the decision, for “the reasons stated for decision often outweigh in signifi-
cance the conclusions reached.” HOWE, supra note 10, at 81.
65. Id. at 87.
66. Id.
67. HOWE, supra note 10, at 87.
68. See discussion infra Part VII.
69. See discussion infra Part IX.
70. HOWE, supra note 10, at 81.
71. In the Presbyterian Church, a “presbytery” is analogous to a Catholic “diocese” or
an American “state.” A presbytery is a regional governing body. A “synod” is an interme-
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When the Supreme Court ruled for the denomination in Watson, ostensi-
bly to prevent courts from delving into matters of religious doctrine, it
involved itself in these disputes as virtually a partisan, and empowered
the politicization of the northern denomination. In these ways it helped
ensure that the Presbyterian Church would not come back together for
more than a century.
III.
The Walnut Street Presbyterian Church was organized in Louisville,
Kentucky, in the late 1840s.72 In 1853, one Edward P. Humphrey and his
wife conveyed a parcel of land to the church, which was soon put under
the control of the church’s trustees.73 The church affiliated with the Pres-
byterian Church in the United States of America (Old School), and re-
mained with the denomination through the Civil War.74 The Walnut
Street Church was also a part of the Synod of Kentucky and the Louis-
ville Presbytery.75 It was this participation in the Louisville Presbytery
and the Synod of Kentucky that led to the landmark property dispute.
The local church was in a presbytery that was in tension with the national
church—tension that exploded shortly after the war ended.
To understand how the Watson decision affirmed division in the coun-
try, it is important to understand how the status quo at the outbreak of
the Civil War came to be.
At the beginning of the secession crisis of 1861, the Old School Presby-
terian Church was the largest denomination that still maintained a unified
national organization.76 Whereas other denominations were torn asunder
by slavery, decades earlier the Presbyterian Church in the United States
of America (PCUSA) split into two denominations over a matter of
church polity unrelated to slavery.77 The division occurred over a plan for
interchurch cooperation with Congregationalists known as the Plan of
Union.78 The party that included the former New England Congregation-
diate body between the local presbytery and the General Assembly, the periodic national
gathering.




76. VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 4.
77. Id.
78. The Plan of Union provided that the Presbyterian and Congregationalist churches
would work together. D.G. Hart & John R. Muether, New Horizons: Turning Points in
American Presbyterian History Part 5: The Plan of Union, 1801, ORTHODOX PRESBYTE-
RIAN CHURCH, http://www.opc.org/nh.html?article_id=27 [https://perma.cc/EBJ8-SDPX].
Rather than have both churches expand into new areas, each church would defer to the
other where it was already established. Id. Thus when Congregationalists moved west to
areas where Presbyterians had already settled and established churches, the Congregation-
alists became Presbyterians. Id. This agreement was possible because Presbyterians and
Congregationalists shared a “Reformed” faith derived from the teachings of John Calvin.
Id. The historical difference between the two churches was polity. Id. Presbyterians gov-
erned themselves according to interconnected general church structures, while Congrega-
tionalists governed themselves at the congregational level. Id.
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alists came to be known as “New School” Presbyterians, while the more
traditional Presbyterians of Scottish and Scots-Irish ancestry
predominated in the Old School group.79 Eventually, the differences be-
tween the two groups became too much. At the 1837 General Assembly,
a majority of Old School Presbyterians managed to rid the Church of
those “tainted with ‘diluted’ orthodoxy and ‘infirm’ ideas of church gov-
ernment” 80 by voting to abrogate the Plan of Union and to expel four
synods dominated by the Presbyterian-Congregational churches.81 These
Synods became the seed of the New School Presbyterian denomination.
The remaining Old School Presbyterian Church, having purged its most
courageous abolitionist members over this unrelated matter in 1837, was
able to do no more than complain ineffectually about slavery until after
the secession crisis and so managed to stay united in the years leading up
to the Civil War.82
So it was that in May of 1861, in the aftermath of the attack on Fort
Sumter, Presbyterians from Confederate and Union states traveled great
distances to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania for the national General Assem-
bly.83 The Assembly had a substantial southern presence, so that there
seemed to be an opportunity for the Assembly to be a last chance for
unity.84
At first, the 1861 Assembly seemed to take pains to promote unity.
When, early in the Assembly, Dr. Gardiner Spring from New York intro-
duced a resolution to express “devotion to the Union of these States, and
. . . loyalty to the Government,” the resolution was promptly tabled.85
When Spring continued to push resolutions affirming support for the
United States government, Charles Hodge, a professor at Princeton The-
ological Seminary, managed to create a committee to consider all pro-
posed motions and work on a compromise.86 Incredibly, in light of the
ongoing war, the committee came back with a moderate position sup-
ported by eight of its nine members.87 The committee’s position did not
concern slavery, which it did not address, but rather focused on the ques-
tion posed by Gardiner Spring: whether the Assembly would “express
devotion” to the national union.88 The committee recommended that the
Assembly “feel bound to abstain from any further declaration . . . which
all our ministers and members . . . might not be able conscientiously and
79. See Hart & Muether, supra note 78.
80. VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 14.
81. GEN. ASSEMBLY OF PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN U.S.A., MINUTES OF THE GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY 421 (1837).
82. In contrast, the New School denomination made significant declarations support-
ing the abolition of slavery, though it held together until 1857. In that year, the New School
church effectively ejected its southern presbyteries, saying they could “have no fellowship”
with those who did not “deplore the evil” of slavery.
83. See VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 42–43.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 48. The vote to table the resolution was 123 to 102. Id.
86. Id. at 56–57.
87. Id. at 57.
88. Id. at 57.
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safely to join.”89 This was the approach that had held the Old School
together since 1837.
Though commissioners to the Assembly began by tabling any discus-
sion of such resolutions, by this point they had warmed to the idea. In
place of the committee’s recommendation, an even more stridently na-
tionalist pair of resolutions than Spring originally proposed were passed
by a large margin.90 Spring had mildly (as it now seemed) written nothing
more severe than that the Assembly should do all in their power “to pro-
mote and perpetuate . . . the integrity of these United States, and to
strengthen, uphold, and encourage, the Federal Government.”91 In con-
trast, the General Assembly concluded the matter by roundly demanding
that “the spirit of that Christian patriotism which the Scriptures enjoin” 92
required them, among other things, to “profess . . . unabated loyalty”93 to
the federal Constitution of the United States, “in all its provisions, re-
quirements, and principles.”94 Even some northern Presbyterians, fully
sympathetic to the Union, saw this for what it was: an illegitimate re-
quirement that one must hold a particular political view in order to be a
Christian in the Presbyterian way.
While the Church’s resolution was celebrated by the northern press,95
it was attacked in a protest by Hodge (himself a northerner)96 and, of
course, was rejected by the southern presbyteries. The Hodge protest as-
serted that the Assembly had unlawfully decided a political question and,
more importantly, made fealty to this political stand a prerequisite of
church membership.97 He argued that this action was beyond the powers
of the Assembly and wholly contrary to the doctrine and spirit of Presby-
terianism.98 Across the South, the Assembly’s actions were the catalyst
for an outright division. Forty-five presbyteries from ten southern synods
assembled at Augusta, Georgia, on December 4, 1861, and created the
Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States of America.99 Thus, the
Old School Presbyterian Church was split in two, and the “great hoop”100
ceased to hold the Union together. Importantly for our case, soon after
the Assembly’s end, the Presbytery of Louisville rejected the Assembly’s
89. GEN. ASSEMBLY OF PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN U.S.A., MINUTES OF THE GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY 325 (1861).
90. See id. at 330.
91. VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 58.
92. GEN. ASSEMBLY OF PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN U.S.A., MINUTES OF THE GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY 325 (1861).
93. Id. at 330.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., The Church and the War, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 1861), http://www.nytimes
.com/1861/05/28/news/the-church-and-the-war.html?pagewanted=1 [https://perma.cc/C65P-
8AR8] (“[T]he Presbyterian Church is true to its eldest and noblest traditions. . . . [I]t has
ever, with rare and eccentric exceptions, been the unflinching champion of universal lib-
erty, a bulwark and the model of representative Government.”).
96. VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 65.
97. Id. at 66.
98. See id. at 66–67.
99. Id. at 102.
100. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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action, stating it constituted “errors of doctrine and principle . . . uncon-
stitutional and of no binding force upon us.”101 The Louisville Presbytery
went on to state it would “cordially unite with all true and conservative
men in our beloved Church, North and South, in defending and preserv-
ing the purity, unity, and prosperity of the . . . Church.”102
IV.
The most significant fact of the 1861 action was that it established that
the Presbyterian Church now believed it could require political as well as
religious beliefs of its members and ministers.103 Having done this once, it
was inevitable that “similar action must be taken in every similar gather-
ing” during the Civil War, because the Spring resolutions “paved the way
for a more emphatic and radical stand in each successive General Assem-
bly.”104 Throughout the course of the war, the General Assembly took
ever more stern political stands.
In 1864, after the General Assembly allowed loyal Old School minis-
ters to proselytize in conquered southern territory and directed
Presbyterians everywhere to give such missionaries “all the aid, counte-
nance, and support . . . practicable,” 105 the Louisville Presbytery “de-
cline[d] to adopt the doctrine or obey the duty enjoined in [its]
deliverance.”106 These actions caused one historian to comment: “There
could be little doubt that if a movement to leave the Old School Presbyte-
rian Church should be inaugurated in Kentucky, the Presbytery of Louis-
ville would have a leading part in the undertaking.”107
The General Assembly of 1865 began with a pronouncement against
the Kentucky Synod and declared that it had “wholly failed to make any
deliverance during the past year calculated to sustain and encourage our
government in its efforts to suppress a most extensive, wanton, and
wicked rebellion, aiming at nothing short of the life of the nation.”108 This
was an ominous beginning for those who hoped for reconciliation. There
were no southern commissioners to vote otherwise, so the northern wing
of the church controlled the Assembly.109 The 1865 Assembly took its cue
from the Reconstruction Congress and took punitive action, including
adopting a report that insisted the church would be free of unrepentant
101. VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 97 (internal citation removed).
102. Id. (internal citation removed).
103. Individual ministers had taken stands before (e.g., Lovejoy, Thornwell, Palmer,
etc.), but the General Assembly had largely avoided such action. Regardless, the Assembly
had not made a particular viewpoint a requirement of membership heretofore.
104. VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 106.
105. Id. at 188 (quoting Letter from Assistant Adjutant General E.D. Townsend to Mil-
itary Generals in Mississippi, Department of the Gulf, of the South, and of Virginia and
North Carolina (March 10, 1864)).
106. Id. at 188–89 (internal citation omitted).
107. Id. at 189.
108. GEN. ASSEMBLY OF PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN U.S.A., MINUTES OF THE GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY 541 (1865).
109. It was somewhat similar to how the Reconstruction Republicans controlled Con-
gress in the Civil War’s aftermath.
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southern ministers, narrowly avoiding expelling any individual Presbyte-
rian church member who would not conform his or her politics to the
denomination’s requirement.110
Thus, in four years, the Assembly had abandoned the spirit of mutual
forbearance when faced with disagreement that had been a hallmark of
the ante-bellum Old School Church. This is not to say that the southern
Presbyterian Church was any less culpable or that the northern Presbyte-
rian Church was not rightly aggrieved by the southerners’ support of slav-
ery and the Confederacy. But the actions of the 1865 Assembly, requiring
federal political loyalty as a term of membership, assured that the Presby-
terian Church, an organization that had promoted unity and purported to
teach grace and forgiveness, would play no role in cooling the simmering
tensions throughout the land.
These actions by the General Assembly inspired a revolt in the Presby-
tery of Louisville (of which the Walnut Street Church was a part) and
instigated the dispute that gave rise to Watson. On September 2, 1865, the
Louisville Presbytery responded to the General Assembly’s actions by
passing the “Declaration and Testimony against the Erroneous and He-
retical Doctrines and Practices which have obtained and been propagated
in the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America during the
last five years” (hereinafter Declaration or Declaration and Testi-
mony).111 The Declaration and Testimony was “an open attack on the
dignity and authority of [the] General Assembly.”112 It recommended re-
sistance to certain orders by the Assembly and that monies be withheld
from the national denomination.113 Through the Declaration and Testi-
mony, the Louisville Presbytery directly challenged the General Assem-
bly’s actions, arguing that the reports and resolutions of the war years
were contrary to the doctrine, practices, and faith of the Church because
they had made membership in the Presbyterian Church dependent on
political views. The Presbytery promised, instead, to “bring back the
church of our fathers,” which it termed the “true Presbyterian church.”114
The Presbytery’s action had an immediate effect on the Walnut Street
Church. Reverend W.T. McElroy, the pastor at the Walnut Street
Church, had been under siege for unrelated reasons. The majority of the
congregation had voted not to keep him as pastor,115 but the session in-
stead renewed McElroy’s contract for six months, an action that divided
the congregation and led to charges and counter-charges being laid.116
Almost immediately thereafter, the Declaration and Testimony came
110. See VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 200–201.
111. Abstract, supra note 47, at 4.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 204 (quoting Declaration and Testimony, 38
BIBLICAL REPERTORY & PRINCETON REV. 427–28 (1866).
115. Abstract, supra note 47, at 5.)
116. Id. at 5–6. John Watson and Joseph Gault, who were southern sympathizers, filed
charges against B.F. Avery, T.J. Hackney, and D. McNaughton, who represented the
northern faction. Id. At the same time, counter charges were filed against Watson and
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before the Presbytery.117 McElroy voted in favor of the Declaration at
the presbytery meeting.118 It does not appear that the congregation ini-
tially voted to dismiss McElroy because he signed the Declaration, but
the opposing parties within the congregation diverged over the Presby-
tery’s resolution, just as they had over McElroy.119 An intra-congrega-
tional dispute thus arose as to the pastor and the actions of the session,
but underlying this was a dispute over the General Assembly’s actions
and the Louisville Presbytery’s Declaration and Testimony.
In the Presbyterian system of 1865 (as today), a decision or dispute by
a local body could be appealed to the next more comprehensive council
of the Church, which in this case was the Presbytery of Louisville.120
However, the dispute within the Walnut Street Church as to whether the
session had acted constitutionally was appealed directly to the Kentucky
Synod—the council that encompassed the Louisville Presbytery as well as
others, with the same boundaries as the state of Kentucky.121 This was
contrary to the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church because there
had never been any initial decision in a church court with original juris-
diction that could then be appealed to a higher ecclesiastical court.
Rather, an intra-congregation dispute was sent directly to the Synod,
leaping over the Presbytery—the court of original jurisdiction. The ap-
peal was raised at the same meeting that took up the Declaration and
Testimony from the Louisville Presbytery.122 Thus this intra-congrega-
tional dispute involving factions for and against the Declaration and Tes-
timony reached the Synod at the same time as the dispute over the
Declaration and Testimony itself.123 From that moment on, the Walnut
Street Church’s own internal struggles became a microcosm of the larger
divisions within the Old School Presbyterian Church.
The Declaration and Testimony elicited a strong reaction within the
Kentucky Synod, which met for an unprecedented ten days over the is-
sue.124 Dr. Robert Breckinridge, a professor at Danville Seminary and
one of the most respected theologians in the Presbyterian Church, led a
fierce resistance to the Declaration and Testimony. Breckenridge went so
far as to call for the ouster of the Declaration supporters from the
Gault. Id. It appears that both sides were working to stir up the congregation to support
their view.
117. Id. at 5.
118. Id.
119. Id. The reasons given initially were that the majority of the congregation “were not
edified by his ministrations, and that the congregation was decreasing under his charge.”
See id.
120. Abstract, supra note 47, at 2.)
121. Id. at 6.
122. The dispute was never, however, appealed to the Presbytery. See id. at 5–6.
123. This occurred in October of 1865. See VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 206; see
also Abstract, supra note 47, at 6 (The Walnut Street Church dispute was appealed to the
Synod of Kentucky on October 20, 1865).
124. VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 206.
2016] Rethinking Deference 827
Synod.125 When he lost that vote,126 he promised to appeal to the Gen-
eral Assembly, so that the Assembly “may censure, as its righteous judg-
ment may deem proper, the sinful acts of the parties brought before the
Synod.”127 While Breckinridge remonstrated and threatened appeal, the
Synod both refused to expel or punish the Declaration supporters, but
also refused to endorse the Declaration.128 Just 35 members of the Synod
felt the Assembly’s actions justified withdrawal from the denomination,
and the Declaration itself was ultimately condemned by the Synod on a
54 to 46 vote.129
Such close votes indicate that the Synod was divided by the Assembly’s
actions and the Louisville Presbytery’s response. Still, as of October 1865,
despite the Synod’s disapproval of the General Assembly’s actions, “a
majority—though a dangerously small majority—of Old School
Presbyterians in Kentucky . . . disapproved of the defiant conduct by the
Presbytery of Louisville and was in favor of continuing in connection with
the General Assembly of the Old School Church.”130 Simply stated, a
narrow majority of the Presbyterians in the state of Kentucky as a whole
were willing to give the General Assembly the benefit of the doubt. It
would take further action to effect a full division that would drive most
Kentucky Presbyterians out of the national church.
In light of the highly contentious division within the Synod, it is not
surprising that the appeal from the Walnut Street Church was not satis-
factorily settled.131 A committee from the synod called a congregational
meeting, at which four new elders sympathetic to the national denomina-
tion and opposed to the Declaration and Testimony (D. McNaughton,
B.F. Avery, D. McPherson, and J. Leech) were elected and the resigna-
tions of elders Watson and Gault, who were southern sympathizers, were
requested.132 The trustees were to maintain control of the building, as
provided by Kentucky law, subject “to the control and direction of the
Session for purposes of religious worship.”133 The synod’s committee
then endeavored to help create a session all could support.134
Unfortunately, the Synod’s work to broker a compromise between the
opposing factions was in vain: elders Watson and Gault denied the valid-
ity of the election of the new elders, and with the help of two of the
125. Id.
126. The vote was 107 to 22. See id.
127. Id. (quoting SYNOD OF KENTUCKY, MINUTES OF SYNOD OF KENTUCKY 20–21
(1865)).
128. Id. at 207–08.
129. VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 208.
130. Id. at 209.
131. The case of the Walnut Street Church was raised at both the Kentucky Synod and
the General Assembly. As we will see, there is dispute as to whether it was a legitimate
appeal, because there is a question as to whether the session ever made a decision that
could be appealed.
132. Watson v. Avery, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 332, 340–42 (1867).
133. Abstract, supra note 47, at 6.
134. See id.
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trustees,135 denied them control of the church property.136 In February of
1866, Avery and others sympathetic to the national church’s position
brought a civil suit in a Kentucky court against Watson and Gault, as well
as the two “southern” trustees, Fulton and Farley, to assert their right as
elders (i.e., elected spiritual leaders of the congregations) to participate in
management of the church property for purposes of religious worship.137
The division within the Walnut Street Church thus reached the civil
courts, which were asked to resolve a matter of religious importance: who
was the rightful session of the congregation?138 At the same time as that
case commenced, the Old School Presbyterian Church prepared for the
1866 General Assembly.139 At the top of the docket was how the Assem-
bly would respond to the Declaration and Testimony of the Louisville
Presbytery.140
V.
The earliest stages of the Watson case comprised an intra-congrega-
tional dispute between two parties, both of which were still, for the time
being, loyal to the Old School Presbyterian Church, though divided as to
the validity of its actions respecting the southern churches and whether
southern Presbyterians could be invited back into the Presbyterian fold.
While the civil case made its way through the courts, events in the back-
ground changed the disposition of the parties.
At the 1866 General Assembly, Dr. Breckenridge brought his
threatened appeal from the Kentucky Synod.141 In the months after the
Declaration, many other Presbyteries had signaled their support for it,
showing, to the consternation of elites in the national Church, that many
Presbyterians felt the denomination’s actions, requiring fealty to certain
political positions, were, in fact, heretical and contrary to Presbyterian
doctrine.142 Many northern Presbyterians worried that support for the
Declaration and Testimony would continue to grow and could undo the
resolutions of the previous Assembly.143 Breckenridge’s appeal was,
therefore, important to the general church.
The General Assembly reprimanded the Louisville Presbytery. To be-
gin, Dr. D.V. McLean, pastor of a small church in New Jersey, introduced
a motion to deny seats to Louisville Presbytery’s delegation altogether
until the matter of the Declaration could be examined.144 The political
135. The three trustees were Henry Farley, George Fulton, and B.F. Avery. Id. Farley
and Fulton united with Watson and Gault against the new elders. Id. Another elder, Hack-
ney, sided with the new slate. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 6–7.
138. See Abstract, supra note 47, at 7.
139. See VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 206.
140. Id. at 220.
141. Id. at 206–07.
142. Id. at 209–17.
143. See id. at 210–11.
144. See id. at 223–24. See also Abstract, supra note 47, at 13.
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question of 1861 and the church membership resolutions of 1865 had con-
stituted a departure from tradition, but the Assembly now considered
something even more extreme—expulsion from the Assembly of commis-
sioners everyone agreed had been properly elected.145 It might have been
supposed, wrote one commentator, “that so high-handed a proposal
would receive no consideration whatever from a dignified deliberative
body,”146 but on the contrary McLean’s proposal was adopted 206 to 56
without any input from the Louisville commissioners.147 Thus, the As-
sembly denied seats to the Louisville commissioners without a hearing
and refused to give them the chance to defend themselves or their
position.
McLean then went a step further, proposing a committee be created to
look into the actions of the Louisville Presbytery. 148 Doing this would
take the matter from the judicial committee, which normally considered
doctrinal disputes, and put it instead into a legislative committee.149 The
judicial committee made decisions according to a deliberative process
that included various procedural protections. When it approved creation
of a legislative committee to decide how to handle the Declaration, the
Assembly essentially voted to decide Breckenridge’s appeal on a purely
political vote, without collecting or hearing evidence.
To say that the rhetoric exchanged over the next few days was heated
would be an understatement.150 Charges and counter-charges flew back
and forth. One commissioner at the Assembly, in light of all the charged
rhetoric, is reported to have said, “while the soldiers were for peace, the
ministers were for war.”151 War within the Presbyterian Church was de-
clared, in a sense, when the committee established to look into the Decla-
ration brought in its report. The committee recommended dissolving the
Louisville Presbytery, requiring ministers to disavow the Declaration in
order to remain with the national church, and removing ministers who
refused to do so from the rolls.152 The proposal was ultimately extended
to all signers of the Declaration (i.e., not just those in the Louisville Pres-
bytery, but anyone in the national church who had voiced agreement with
the Louisville Presbytery’s position).153 The proposal was slightly tem-
pered, so that the signers of the Declaration would be able to present
145. See VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 219–20.
146. Id. at 224.
147. Id. at 225.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 226.
150. For example, one commissioner, in speaking of the Louisville Presbytery, said,
“[W]hen we have met the hydra with his hundred heads, and those hundred heads lie
bleeding around us, we are to be frightened from our propriety by the wriggling of his
dying tail?” See id. at 233.
151. VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 260.
152. GEN. ASSEMBLY OF PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN U.S.A., MINUTES OF THE GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY 39 (1866).
153. See VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 262.
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their case at the 1867 General Assembly.154 However, until then, no sign-
ers of the Declaration were allowed to participate in any Presbyterian
functions beyond the local level.155
Thus, the Assembly officially removed all supporters of the Declara-
tion from any high office or authority in the general Presbyterian
church.156 The Assembly did this without giving the supporters of the
Declaration any chance to explain their position.157 The Louisville com-
missioners, having been denied their chance to speak, swore to take the
matter back to their presbytery and departed.158
The Louisville commissioners were, therefore, not present when the
General Assembly considered the appeal (from the Synod of Kentucky)
regarding the situation within their own Presbytery at the Walnut Street
Church.159 Not surprisingly, the same Assembly that had just effectively
banished the Louisville Presbytery and its supporters found that the pro-
northern faction of McNaughton, Avery, and Leach had been duly
elected and wrongfully denied their status by the Louisville Presbytery.160
Pro-southern Watson and Gault, conversely, were stripped of their eccle-
siastical standing. 161
Any hope of reconciliation within the denomination with the border
state Presbyterians (and with the South, generally) had been quashed by
the actions of the 1866 Assembly. This was probably intentional. The
most outspoken proponent of harsh resolutions against the Declaration
supporters was Thomas E. Thomas, pastor of the First Presbyterian
Church of Dayton, Ohio.162 A letter that Thomas received toward the
end of the General Assembly from William C. Anderson exhibits part of
what may have motivated the Assembly’s majority:
Brother. . .Thomas . . . Let all the Southern sympathizers go. Then
urge on union with the New School Presbyterians. Don’t be alarmed
by the . . . old Philadelphia-Princeton clique of pro-slavery men. Let
them go: they have been the deep curse of the Old School Church
since 1845. A union with our New School brethren, now in perfect
sympathy with us, will give us the grandest organization, especially if
we can clear of [out?] the Hodge-VanDyke-Boardman school of
Presbyterians. God bless you. Finish up the work that we may have
154. See id. at 266. In light of how the Louisville commissioners were denied the right to
speak in 1866, one wonders how any signer’s defense of the Declaration in 1867 would
have gone. Regardless, the point soon became moot when most of the signers of the Decla-
ration withdrew from the Church. Only two ultimately appeared in 1867 to explain their
action. See id.
155. GEN. ASSEMBLY OF PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN U.S.A., MINUTES OF THE GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY 60–61 (1866).
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 235.
159. Abstract, supra note 47, at 16.
160. See id. at 15–16.
161. See id.
162. VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 228.
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peace in the future.163
As Anderson’s letter indicates, Thomas and his cohort may have
wished to see the Louisville Presbytery and its members expelled. Such
an expulsion would open up the possibility of reunion with the fiercely
anti-slavery New School of Presbyterians. Thomas would in fact get his
wish within a few years.
VI.
With hope of reconciliation gone, and after having been denied seats at
the Assembly and deprived of status within the church, the Louisville
commissioners returned home to a Presbytery meeting. On June 19, 1866,
the Louisville Presbytery gathered and, in defiance of the Assembly’s act,
allowed supporters of the Declaration to be enrolled in the meeting.164
The majority who defied the Assembly declared itself the rightful Presby-
tery.165 The minority, which remained true to the Assembly, demurred.
Thus, in June of 1866, immediately after the 1866 Assembly, the Louis-
ville Presbytery itself was divided in two.166
From this point on, the Walnut Street Church dispute was carried on
between rival parties, one of which was no longer part of the Old School
denomination, but each claiming to be joined with the true church. The
anti-Assembly Presbytery (the Sanders Presbytery for the name of its
leader) declared itself “absolved from all obligations to obey or in any
manner to recognize the acts and ordinances of the General Assembly of
1866” subsequent to the expulsion of the Louisville Presbytery’s commis-
sioners.167 The Sanders Presbytery in fact would not recognize “any Gen-
eral Assembly hereafter which recognizes the validity of the revolutionary
acts and ordinances of the Assemblies of 1865 and 1866,”168 but the Pres-
bytery would join with other churches and ministers who “‘stand in the
old ways’ of the Assemblies of 1837 to 1860” and who recognize that
“[t]he General Assembly never had the power to establish regulations
and a new plan of government.”169 In this way the Sanders Presbytery
directly challenged the legitimacy of the Assembly’s actions and called
the Assembly out for acting beyond its powers. But the Sanders Presby-
tery promised reunion in the future should the Assembly change again.170
The Sanders Presbytery made up three-fourths of the ministers in Lou-
isville,171 but a remnant remained loyal to the Assembly. That remnant
(the McMillan Presbytery) declared that the Sanders supporters, minis-
163. Id. at 231 (quoting Letter from William C. Anderson to T.E. Thomas (May 24,
1866)).
164. Abstract, supra note 47, at 16.
165. See id. (referring to the Sanders Presbytery).
166. See id. (referring to the pro-Assembly Presbytery as the McMillan Presbytery).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Abstract, supra note 47, at 17.
170. See id.
171. VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 261.
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ters, and elders alike, had vacated their positions until they should “re-
trace their steps . . . and renew their adherence and submission . . . to the
General Assembly.”172 In October, the Synod of Kentucky met and simi-
larly split into the Douglas Synod (anti-Assembly) and the Lapsley Synod
(pro-Assembly).173
This division was confirmed a year later by the General Assembly of
1867, which officially recognized the McMillan Presbytery and Lapsley
Synod.174 The Assembly declared that the recalcitrant Presbyteries and
Synods were “in no sense true and lawful Synods and Presbyteries in con-
nection with and under the care and authority of the General Assembly
of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.”175
Within the Walnut Street Church, the majority recognized the author-
ity of the McMillan Presbytery and the Lapsley Synod.176 Avery, Leach,
McNaughton, and Hackney led this group.177 A minority supported the
Sanders Presbytery and the Douglas Synod—Watson, Gault, Fulton, and
Farley led this group.178 The division within the local congregation re-
flected the division with the national church, the Synod, and the Presby-
tery, but the Walnut Street Church was unique: a pending lawsuit meant
the courts would now weigh in on the intra-Presbyterian dispute.
The local Kentucky court issued an initial ruling in favor of the Avery
faction.179 When the Watson faction refused to recognize the initial order,
the court ordered the marshal to take control of the property.180 At that
point, the Watson faction “abandoned all connection with the property
and all participation in its control” which would later figure in the ques-
tion whether there was in fact any claim for relief in Watson.181 In May of
1867, the local court issued its final order, explaining that the Avery fac-
tion were legitimate members of the session with the Watson faction.182
The two groups together were to control the property “under the regula-
tions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.”183 Be-
cause this ruling predated the 1867 General Assembly’s renunciation of
the Sanders Presbytery, both parties at this point could still legitimately
claim to be members of the same national church.
The state case then went on appeal to the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
The appeals court handed down a decision in November of 1867, recog-
nizing the Watson group and denying the legitimacy of the Avery
172. Abstract, supra note 47, at 11.
173. Id. at 18–19.
174. Id. at 19–20.
175. Id. at 20.
176. Id. at 19.
177. Abstract, supra note 47, at 19.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 7.
180. Id. at 7–8.
181. Id. at 8.
182. Abstract, supra note 47, at 8.
183. Id.
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group.184 The ruling of the appeals court was based on Presbyterian eccle-
siastical governance. The court held that more encompassing bodies (e.g.,
Synod, General Assembly) have the power to hear appeals, but for there
to be an appeal, there must first be a decision below.185 The question of
who were the legitimate elders of the Walnut Street Church should have
been tried before a presbytery (i.e., the Louisville Presbytery) before be-
ing brought to the Synod of Kentucky because the Presbyterian constitu-
tion did not allow for Synods (or the General Assembly) to exercise
original jurisdiction over matters arising in a local congregation. Because
“[n]o appeal had been prosecuted; nor was any decision of session, pres-
bytery, or synod before the assembly for revision,” the higher bodies
could not organize or endorse an election in a local church such as the
one that purported to bring the Avery contingent to power.186 Simply put,
the Court of Appeals found the election of the Avery faction unconstitu-
tional by Presbyterian ecclesiastical law because the case initially began
in a Presbyterian appellate body instead of one with original ecclesiastical
jurisdiction. The election of the Avery faction violated the Presbyterian
Church’s own doctrine and rules, and in embracing that election, the
General Assembly had departed from long-held Presbyterian doctrine as
to church governance.
Thus, the Kentucky appellate court restored the original session of
Watson, Gault, and Hackney as elders.187 Fulton, Farley, and Avery were
also restored to office as trustees.188 The Watson group had been some-
what vindicated, but legally the church was now in the status quo ante,
with a divided session and board of trustees.
Since 1861, southern Presbyterians had been insisting that the General
Assembly’s actions on politics and requirements for church membership
were unconstitutional, directly contrary to Presbyterian rules and tradi-
tions.189 Now the highest court in the state of Kentucky had stepped in
and agreed with the southerners—the General Assembly was acting con-
trary to its own constitution. After six years of intra-church dispute, the
highest state law court had vindicated the southern complaint.
It was at this point that federal courts intervened.
VII.
From a practical perspective, the Kentucky Court of Appeals decision
had almost no effect. The property was being used by the Avery contin-
gent, as the Watson group had ceased all efforts at control.190 The Avery
group was able to call a new pastor, who was received by the McMillan
184. See Watson v. Avery, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 332, 363 (1867).
185. Id. at 348.
186. Id. at 359–60. The court agreed that the Avery group had petitioned with a com-
plaint, but a complaint is not the same as an appeal. Id. at 360.
187. Abstract, supra note 47, at 12.
188. Id.
189. VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 66.
190. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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Presbytery.191 For over two years the Avery group had used the church
undisturbed apart from a few idle threats from Farley, Fulton, and
others.192 The Avery group exerted effective control and full use of the
property. Why then did the Avery contingent continue its litigation, and
why did federal courts go to such extreme lengths to exercise questiona-
ble jurisdiction, all the way to the highest court in the land?
The answer likely lies in the importance of the Kentucky decision to
the Old School Presbyterian Church and in the often-vindictive character
of Reconstruction era politics. For years, southern supporters had been
insisting that the actions of the General Assembly were contrary to the
Church’s constitution.193 The Declaration and Testimony had made pre-
cisely this point—insisting the Assembly’s actions were contrary not only
to its own traditions, but to the tradition of historic and ecumenical Chris-
tianity. The Assembly’s radical actions in crushing dissent suggest the
southern complaints had purchase.
Now, however, a state court had given succor to the dissenters. More
than that, the Kentucky appellate court had explicitly overruled the deci-
sion made by the national General Assembly resolving the dispute in
favor of the pro-northern faction.194 In essence, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals had followed the old common rule and found that the Old
School General Assembly’s actions were a departure from doctrine.
At a time in which the national church was so divided, this could not
stand. The result was that Presbyterians—for the first time ever—de-
clared that courts should not examine church doctrine in their fact-find-
ing.195 The McMillan Presbytery reacted to the Kentucky court’s decision
with a harsh resolution, denying the competency or authority of civil
courts to adjudicate ecclesiastical matters, even though it was the Avery
faction, loyal to this same Presbytery, that had commenced the lawsuit in
the first place.196 The General Assembly of 1868 entered the fray too,
siding clearly with the Avery contingent and unanimously condemning
the Kentucky Court of Appeals’ decision as “encroachment on religious
liberty” and “a violation of the principle which determines the indepen-
dence of the church upon the state.”197
The language the Assembly used is almost the same language the Su-
preme Court ultimately used in the Watson decision. Essentially, the Su-
191. Abstract, supra note 47, at 21.
192. See id. at 29.
193. We use the term “southern” here to refer primarily to the border state Presbyteri-
ans from Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland that were consistently outvoted and ultimately
driven from the church in 1865 and 1866. See VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 209–10.
The term does not include the Southern Presbyterian Church which had already broken
off, but it does include the southern delegates to the 1861 Assembly who, had their posi-
tion been the majority, might have averted the division within the church. See id. at 186.
194. Watson v. Avery, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 332, 363 (1867).
195. Abstract, supra note 47, at 22.
196. Id.
197. GEN. ASSEMBLY OF PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN U.S.A., MINUTES OF THE GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY 652 (1868). See also Abstract, supra note 47, at 25.
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preme Court endorsed the objections of the Old School denomination in
Watson. The Court’s holding stating that American courts should defer to
a church’s hierarchy was an entirely new principle of law.198 The new
principle displaced the British common law rule, which allowed the courts
to examine church doctrines as relevant facts, as the Kentucky court had
done.199 The Court’s new principle required it to avoid adjudicating the
full corpus of relevant facts and law while focusing exclusively on a single
fact, namely, the general church body’s position. Once this one fact was
known, the outcome of this and every future case in which the rule was
applied was foreordained. Watson thus made general church bodies
judges of their own cause.
Recall the questionable jurisdictional origins of the case.200 The suspect
nature of Federal jurisdiction is now more apparent as we come to the
end of the story. To summarize, the United States Supreme Court exer-
cised questionable jurisdiction to rule on a largely moot property dispute,
thereby enacting a new legal doctrine, and wholly in keeping with the
rhetorical declarations of one faction in a divided Church, despite appar-
ent evidence that the national church was violating its own constitution.
By stating that courts would defer to the hierarchy, the Court overturned
the Kentucky decision, stripped the local majority of any moral support
from court rulings, and assured that the General Assembly would be free
to rule as it saw fit, able to rely on the courts to enforce its position. For
more than a century afterwards, merely finding themselves in a property
dispute with their denomination meant dissenters could not prevail, re-
gardless of other facts, law, or equity. Courts would simply enforce the
denomination’s position regardless of other considerations. In states that
continue to make use of the Watson rule, or turn the decision in Jones v.
Wolf on its head so that it becomes little more than a restatement of
Watson, this remains the case today.
Why did the Court so decisively rule for the Old School Assembly’s
side? Perhaps this is explained in part by looking at who the legal actors
were in the case. The pro-Assembly faction was represented by B. H.
Bristow, former Union general and federal prosecutor in Kentucky whose
work earned him appointment as the first Solicitor General by President
Grant.201 Bristow was a fierce, pro-Union advocate who earned his repu-
tation prosecuting the Ku Klux Klan.202 In light of the terrible atrocities
he had seen, it is not surprising that Bristow would have had no sympathy
for pro-southern positions. He had political reasons to take a case like
this and fight all the way to the highest court of the land.203
198. See Watson, 80 U.S. 679, 730 (1871).
199. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 44–58 and accompanying text.
201. For a biography of Bristow, see the Solicitor General’s website at http://www.jus-
tice.gov/osg/bio/benjamin-h-bristow [https://perma.cc/Z64X-D2RH].
202. Id.
203. As far as the authors are aware, Watson was the last case Bristow handled prior to
becoming Solicitor General.
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The Watson opinion was written by Justice Miller, a man with his own
unique biases in a case such as this. Miller was from Kentucky, was a
strong supporter of the Union, and was a fierce opponent of slavery.204
He is reported to have seen his nursemaid flogged when he was a child,
which was an experience that affected him for life.205 In 1849, he ran for
the Kentucky Constitutional Convention on a platform of emancipating
the slaves.206 When the emancipation effort failed, Miller was so dis-
gusted that he moved to Iowa.207 After his appointment in 1862, Miller
became the most prolific writer on the Court.208 Salmon P. Chase said of
him, “[B]eyond question the dominant personality . . . whose mental
force and individuality are felt by the Court more than any other.”209 It
was this man from Kentucky with a deep-seated aversion to slavery who
was now called upon to render judgment in a case he would have seen not
merely as a property dispute, or as a question of which rival group of
elders and trustees were legitimately elected (a theological question), but
rather as a controversy between pro and anti-slavery groups—even
though the issue of slavery was, at most, a shadow in the factual back-
ground of the case.
The other justices were not without an opinion either. Justice Swayne
was known as a fierce abolitionist; he freed slaves that his wife inherited
and became an early supporter of the Republican Party.210 His decisions
during the Civil War supported the government’s emergency actions.211
Justice Field was the son of a stern Congregationalist minister and at-
tended Congregationalist-dominated Williams College, graduating in the
same year as the New School/Old School division in the Presbyterian
Church.212 Field’s religious background (and pro-Union view) would
have biased him to favor the anti-slavery Assembly group.
Justice Strong was the son of a northern Presbyterian minister and an
ardent Presbyterian. In retirement, he devoted his energy to religious en-
deavors.213 A pro-Union, northern Presbyterian, Strong too had “strong”
sympathies for the pro-Union Assembly.
None of this is to suggest the justices were incapable of neutrality, but
in the aftermath of a brutal civil war that had taken more than 600,000
lives, the shocking assassination of the man who had appointed many of
them, and the fact that the justices surely knew people who had died in
the recent war, it would have been hard to resist seeing this property
204.  THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES 1789-1993 176–77
(Clare Cushman ed., 1993).
205. Id. at 177.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 179.
209. Id. at 179.
210.  THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES 1789-1993 172–73
(Clare Cushman ed., 1993).
211. Id. at 174.
212. Id. at 186.
213. Id. at 200.
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dispute clearly. This dispute was deeply grounded in the theological ques-
tion of whether Christianity requires a certain political view, but may
have been viewed as nothing more than the attempt of an anti-Union,
pro-slavery faction to continue the Civil War.
Watson is often thought of as a religion case, but it may be better
viewed as a Reconstruction case. In its simplest terms, the case was prose-
cuted and argued by an ardent foe of secessionists (Bristow) at the height
of Reconstruction and decided by a Republican Court filled with justices
from a pro-Union, Presbyterian/Congregationalist background. For these
figures to have done anything other than rule decisively in favor of the
pro-Assembly, anti-slavery faction would have been truly surprising. In-
deed, in light of the strong Presbyterian ties of the Justices who com-
prised the Court, it is possible that the Justices not only wished to oppose
southern sympathizers, but also to establish northern control of the Pres-
byterian Church.
VIII.
Historian Mark DeWolf Howe insists that the Watson action (which he
admits was extraordinary)214 was meant to affirm union. This seems
doubtful, but even if it was so meant, the action did precisely the oppo-
site. The northern Old School denomination did not speak forcefully
against slavery until after the division of 1861 was effected. Instead, the
Assembly created the schism by including “unabated loyalty” to the fed-
eral Constitution as a religious requirement. The southerners cogently ar-
gued that the Assembly divided itself from its own tradition, indeed from
ecumenical Christianity as a whole, by making a political viewpoint a re-
quirement for membership.215 The pro-slavery position of the
southerners was horrendous, but their theological view of forbearance
and mutual respect, along with their closer alignment with the larger
Christian tradition regarding the relationship between church and state,
might have allowed for reconciliation.216 The vituperative responses of
the 1865 and 1866 Assemblies allowed no room for this, and if evidence
like William C. Anderson’s letter is any indication,217 the northern major-
ity may even have wanted the division. By overturning the Kentucky
court and the old common law rule, the Supreme Court assured that divi-
sion over political issues (and in particular divisions over the lingering
effects of racism and slavery) would be a hallmark of the Presbyterian
Church—both the northern church and the southern church—for genera-
214. HOWE, supra note 10, at 81.
215. VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 102–03.
216. This is not to say modern readers should be sympathetic to the southern view,
seeing as it supported slavery and was couched in actions such as the Black Codes. But one
does wonder if a more conciliatory approach by the national church (and if the church
could not show a conciliatory approach, who could?) might have led to reunion of the
Presbyterian Church and perhaps a better history for the entire country. Such speculation,
however, is beyond the purview of this article.
217. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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tions to come. The two branches were divided for 116 years. Only in 1983
did the northern and southern Presbyterian churches finally reunite.218
In the end, the desire of William C. Anderson came to pass. In 1869,
the remaining element of the Old School Presbyterian Church reunited
with the New School Presbyterians.219 Recall that the New School church
was primarily northern and anti-slavery, and that it was in large part the
votes of conservatives and southerners that had driven out the New
School in 1837.220 Now the conservatives had either left or been driven
from the Church, and the objections of the New School Presbyterians to
the Old School Presbyterians were papered over by their agreement on
the contentious issues that had divided the country. In 1869, the Basis for
Reunion was approved by the Old School Assembly 285 to 9.221 Shortly
thereafter, the Presbyteries approved the action, and the two churches
were reunited.222
There was peace of a sort in the Presbyterian Church. The division of
1837 had been partially healed. Unfortunately, peace came at the cost of
a new, deeper division.223 The regional split that emerged meant that
there was now no great hoop bringing together north and south. Cyrus
McCormick actually worked to reunify the Presbyterian churches after
the war, so great was his belief in the Church’s potential force for good,
but his efforts were in vain.224 No reunion took place. Southern
Presbyterians would have no northern counterparts to interact with.
There would be no sharing of theological values in the seminaries, no
debating of virtues at the assemblies, and no representative democracy
that might bring the country together. After the Presbyterians failed to
reunite, all of America’s major churches now reflected the divide that had
just permeated the country.225
Had the southerners been invited back into the church, would their
engagement with their northern brethren have led to a more moderate,
more contrite, less-racist South, a more peaceful American history, and a
more hopeful tomorrow? We will never know, for the Watson v. Jones
decision cemented the actions of the Old School General Assembly,
blocked any legal recourse for citizens unjustly deprived of church prop-
erty, and reaffirmed the ongoing division.
218. See Church History: The History of the Presbyterian Church, PRESBYTERIAN MIS-
SION AGENCY, http://www.presbyterianmission.org/what-we-believe/church-history/ [https:/
/perma.cc/ZU4E-J9HM] (“Presbyterian denominations in the United States have split and
parts have reunited several times starting in the 18th century. Currently the largest group is
the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), which has its national offices in Louisville, Ky. It was
formed in 1983 as a result of reunion between the Presbyterian Church in the U.S. (PCUS),
the so-called ‘southern branch,’ and the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.
(UPCUSA), the so-called ‘northern branch.’”).
219. See VANDER VELDE, supra note 15, at 516.
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224. Id. at 502.
225. Id. at 4.
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IX.
Over time, the effect of the Watson decision on the polity of the Pres-
byterian Church has been dramatic. The Presbyterian Church soon began
to adjust its polity to bring it into alignment with the Court’s description
of it as hierarchical in Watson, suggesting the description there was ten-
dentious even at the time. In short, in response to Watson, the Presbyte-
rian Church (USA) and its antecedent bodies discovered themselves as
hierarchical churches, at least with respect to church property disputes.
Before Watson, church property disputes were adjudicated either ac-
cording to Lord Eldon’s Rule or using what, since Jones v. Wolf, has been
known as “neutral principles of law.”226 However, as often as not, local
agreements eliminated any need to resort to the courts at all. Presbyte-
rian general churches took this situation for granted and did not think
they had beneficial ownership rights in the properties of local congrega-
tions. Thus, in 1862, the New School General Assembly responded to a
presbytery’s question as to how a congregation could withdraw and be-
come independent. The General Assembly’s answer was that the church
should simply withdraw, “declining the further jurisdiction of the Presby-
tery. . .” and all the presbytery should do was to note “the character of
the act of the withdrawing church” in its minutes.227 Similarly, in 1866,
several congregations from the Baltimore area withdrew from the Old
School denomination and formed an independent Presbytery of Patapsco
that was soon received as an entire presbytery by the (southern) PCUS
and incorporated into its Presbytery of Rappahannock.228 Each of these
congregations kept its property. After an official attempt failed to per-
suade them to remain, the Presbytery of Baltimore simply recorded the
withdrawal of the churches in their minutes and removed the ministers
from their rolls. The congregation at Bladensburg, Maryland, later re-
turned to the reunited PCUSA’s newly-formed Presbytery of Washington
City together with its property, and the PCUS did not object.229
After Watson, Presbyterian bodies began shifting their polity to con-
form to it. Thus, in 1876, the General Assembly of the PCUSA, in re-
sponding to a presbytery’s question about the dismissal of a congregation
to another denomination, stated that “[q]uestions of property must be
determined by the courts of the State,” though it still did not assert that
as a national, general church it held a trust over local church property.230
Eventually they did begin to make such assertions, however. The hier-
archical deference rule created by the Watson decision was applied by
226. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727–28 (1871).
227. GEN. ASSEMBLY OF PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN U.S.A., MINUTES OF THE GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY 171-172 (1862) (New School).
228. E.T. THOMPSON, PRESBYTERIANS IN THE SOUTH, vol. 2 182 (John Knox Press,
1973).
229. See J.E NOURSE, ET AL., THE PRESBYTERY OF WASHINGTON CITY AND ITS
CHURCHES 26 (Gibson Bros. eds., 1888).
230. GEN. ASSEMBLY OF PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN U.S.A., MINUTES OF THE GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY 80 (1876).
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state courts at the behest of presbyteries and denominations over the next
several decades to award properties to general church bodies who had
not paid for them and had only technical and questionable church-politi-
cal claims to an interest in those properties.
This trend became clear to southern Presbyterians very quickly. In 1894
the southern PCUS declined the northern PCUSA’s invitation to begin
talks preparatory to reunion. In part this was because the memory that
some of their affiliated congregations lost property to northern church
factions because of the Watson decision. They replied, “the property in-
terests of the Southern Church, under the decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States, would be seriously jeopardized, in the event of any
subsequent change in our relations.”231 The ministers and elders of the
PCUS had learned from observation that under Watson’s deference rule,
the outcome of cases was foreordained to favor national denominations
that—unlike their own denomination at that time—chose to invoke it.
This concern of the PCUS was soon justified by emergent events. In
1906, the Cumberland Presbyterian Church, a denomination originally
comprised of congregations that withdrew from the PCUSA in 1810, re-
united with the PCUSA, but a number of local churches, making up
about one third of the Cumberland denomination’s membership, did not
participate in the reunion and continued as a separate denomination that
still exists today. The PCUSA and its presbyteries sued some of the with-
drawing congregations. Although a few withdrawing Cumberland congre-
gations in Tennessee and Missouri prevailed and kept their property,232
most congregations in other states lost their property because state
courts, applying the principle of hierarchical deference, deferred to the
national PCUSA.233 The denomination, of course, took the position that
the dissenting local churches had forfeited their rights to the local church
property.234 When the Cumberland Presbyterian Church was originally
formed by ministers and congregations departing the PCUSA in 1810, the
PCUSA did not inquire about the ownership of any property in use by
Cumberland congregations or their ministers. Nevertheless, under the
nearly universal application of the deference rule created by the Supreme
Court in Watson, the loss of Cumberland church properties was
tremendous.
This pattern was repeated in 1935, in connection with a division that
gave rise to the Orthodox Presbyterian Church (the OPC). When the
OPC was founded, the PCUSA General Assembly created a special com-
mittee, “to guard all [the PCUSA’s] interests and protect all its property
231. MINUTES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE
UNITED STATES 212 (1894).
232. See, e.g., Landrith v. Hudgins, 120 S.W. 783, 816 (1907).
233. See, e.g., Brown v. Clark, 116 S.W. 360, 364–65 (Tex. 1909); Helm v. Zarecor, 213
F. 648, 659 (M.D. Tenn. 1913); Sherard v. Walton, 206 F. 562, 565 (W.D. Tenn. 1913). See
also BEN M. BARRUS, ET AL., A PEOPLE CALLED CUMBERLAND PRESBYTERIANS 360–68
(1972).
234. Landrith, 120 S.W. at 786.
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rights.”235 This committee oversaw cases for the denomination in which,
for the most part, the automatic action of the hierarchical deference rule
assured that properties stayed with the PCUSA presbyteries. For exam-
ple, when the Susquehanna Avenue Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia
voted to renounce the authority of the PCUSA, the Presbytery of Phila-
delphia declared the congregation “dissolved” (a fiction, as the congrega-
tion manifestly still existed) and claimed its property.236 The hierarchical
deference rule was applied,237 and the congregation lost its property, in
spite of the fact that the denomination had not invested in it, and there
was no viable minority who wished to remain with the denomination.238
Having dissipated a thriving congregation and claimed its assets through
the automatic operation of Watson’s deference rule—assets for which
that congregation had paid without assistance from the general church
and title to which was held by the congregation’s own trustees—the Pres-
bytery of Philadelphia did nothing of enduring significance with their
gains. The lot at Susquehanna Avenue and North Marshall Street on
which this congregation’s building once stood shows no sign there was
once a vital place of worship there.
When, in 1979, Jones v. Wolf again changed the legal landscape by pro-
viding states with an alternative to Watson, the Presbyterian polity again
changed in response. Thus, a PCUS committee report in 1981 stated that
because of Jones, a new polity provision was needed, “in order that the
results produced by the landmark decision of Watson v. Jones . . . will
continue to be attained in cases involving our Church.”239 The pragmatic
focus on getting a desirable judicial result, rather than on adhering to
principles of Presbyterian polity concerning property, is unmistakable.
It appears, then, that since the Watson Court suggested to the PCUSA
and similar denominations that they could assert an interest in congrega-
tional property, these denominations have shown themselves willing to
improvise their polity related to church property to keep up with judicial
cues. Indeed, even today, when the legal circumstance seems to demand
it, the Presbyterian Church (USA) is as ready to deny it is hierarchical in
polity as it is to assert the opposite in property matters.240
235. GEN. ASSEMBLY OF PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN U.S.A., MINUTES OF THE GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY 103 (1935).
236. In re Dissolution of Susquehanna Ave. Presbyterian Church of Philadelphia, 31 Pa.
D. & C. 597, 605 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1938).
237. Id. at 609–10.
238. In a number of other cases, PCUSA presbyteries were able to take properties be-
cause the congregations entering the OPC refused to make use of civil courts due to their
interpretation of the Christian Bible at 1 Corinthians 6:1–7, which says in part: “To have
lawsuits at all with one another is already a defeat for you. Why not rather suffer wrong?
Why not rather be defrauded?” 1 Corinthians 6:7.
239. GEN. ASSEMBLY OF PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN U.S.A., MINUTES OF THE GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES 105 (1981).
240. Thus, when it feared legal liability for a minister’s misconduct, the same PCUSA
presbytery that claimed in sworn testimony that it was hierarchical in Timberridge Presby-
terian Church, Inc. v. Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, Inc, adopted a report claiming the
opposite, namely that, “. . . in our Presbyterian form of government (as opposed to a hier-
archical polity) we understand that ‘[e]cclesiastical jurisdiction is a shared power . . . .’” 132
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Watson, wherever its rule has been applied, has turned the courts into
enforcement agencies whose only role in hierarchical church property dis-
putes is to give effect to the claims of the party representing the general
church, regardless of any other relevant facts and law. When the hierar-
chical deference rule is applied, dissenting congregations lose just be-
cause they dissent, rather than because their claims are fairly adjudicated
and they do not prevail. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether Wat-
son’s deference rule violates the Establishment clause of the First
Amendment, as the Louisiana Supreme Court has suggested it does.241
As church leaders, legal practitioners, and jurists litigating and deciding
church property disputes deal with today’s cases, which also often mingle
property questions with moral and political issues, all would do well to
remember how the Supreme Court’s support for purely political, non-
religious commitments in a particular church denomination contributed
to a great division of our country.
We can only hope that today’s divisions will be settled with more grace.
One way to move in that direction would be for courts to leave behind
the highly problematic deference rule (along with versions of the neutral
principles approach that turn Jones v. Wolf on its head and make it just
another form of deference)242 and in its place use an approach that takes
into account the full factual, legal, and equitable background of each
unique church property case.
S. Ct. 2772 (2012), (No. 11-1101), 2012 WL 755072; Minutes of the Presbytery of Greater
Atlanta, A-52 (Aug. 17, 2013) (on file with the Presbytery of Greater Atlanta) (emphasis
added) (alterations in original).
241. The Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledged in 1982 that the application of hier-
archical deference is effectively an establishment of the hierarchy’s religion: “Refusal to
adjudicate a dispute over property rights or contractual obligations . . . simply because the
litigants are religious organizations, may deny a local church recourse to an impartial body
to resolve a just claim, thereby violating its members’ rights under the free exercise provi-
sion, and also constituting a judicial establishment of the hierarchy’s religion.” Fluker Cmty.
Church v. Hitchens, 419 So. 2d 445, 447 (La. 1982) (emphasis added).
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